

BASIC ADVICE FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS OF HISTORY

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THINGS TO AVOID

Here are the three most important things to avoid if you want to improve your chances of landing a good tenure track job, according to a study by the Mellon Foundation undertaken to determine the factors most likely to prevent the success of graduate students obtaining their degrees from the University of Chicago:

1. Don't change your PhD adviser. Nothing is more likely to slow you down and disrupt your network of scholarly connections.
2. Don't take longer than 8 years! Students who take 6, 7, or 8 years to finish their dissertation all do fine. Students who take longer do significantly worse.
3. Don't waste time on perfecting your dissertation or publishing articles. Finish the dissertation and get out.

Let me add a fourth point of my own:

4. Don't miss deadlines. The price you pay for missing a deadline is always larger, and sometimes much larger, than whatever you may gain from having more time to turn in a paper, complete an application, or finalize a proposal.

THINGS TO DO

If you have not done so already, make sure you read Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, *The Craft of Research*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) and/or Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, *The Modern Researcher*, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992). These are two very different, but equally outstanding guides to developing the basic skills a good historical researcher needs and to turning them into lifelong habits. Read them carefully, cover to cover, and take copious notes.

Do not fall into the trap of thinking that you are already aware of what it is that you need to do. Do not assume that, because I will not keep referring to these books, their content doesn't matter to me. The reason I don't refer to them is that the advice they give is so elementary that I presuppose it in pretty much everything I do. Even if you are already well on your way towards the goals towards which these books direct you, they will serve as a very useful check on your own judgment of what you need to consider.

I will limit my own advice to one principle and two things you have to turn into a daily habit. The principle is this:

- **Make no important decisions without consulting your adviser**

What is an important decision? The answer to that question depends on the stage of your academic career. In your first two years in graduate school, important decisions have to do with your choice of courses and the topics of your seminar papers. Later they concern your choice of fields for the oral examination and of the faculty who will serve as your examiners. Then, of course, there is the choice of your dissertation topic—crucial for the remainder of your career. You will also choose fellowships for which to apply for and courses in which to serve as an assistant. Towards the end of your stay at Chicago you will make decisions about the timing of your defense, the institutions to which to apply for jobs, and the kind of jobs to apply for.

Regardless of what counts as an important decision at any given time, you should not make such decisions without having consulted your adviser. Students tend to make decisions without consulting their advisers for two main reasons. One is that they want to prove that they can manage on their own. The other is that they are afraid to ask. Both of these reasons are misguided.

You are in graduate school because you do *not* know how to make such decisions on your own. You are *not supposed* to know. You are supposed to *learn*. If you already knew, you wouldn't need to learn, and there would be nothing for your advisers to teach.

The effect of making unilateral decisions are all counterproductive. In the first place, they will give your adviser the feeling that you think his advice is useless, since otherwise you would presumably have asked for it. In the second place, you will give your adviser the impression that you are likely to shoot from the hip. And in the third place, you have prevented your adviser from having a stake in the consequences of your decision. Those consequences will be on your head.

So don't do it. Keep in mind that your progress through graduate school is based on a relationship of mutual trust between you and your adviser. You trust your adviser to teach you as best possible. Your adviser trusts you to ask for the help you need. In order to maintain that trust you must engage in a constant process of negotiation and consultation with your adviser.

That does not mean you have to meet every day. It does not even mean you must send email every day. It rather means that you must not surprise your adviser with decisions out of the blue.

The two things you ought to turn into a daily habit are these:

- **First, keep a bibliography**

It doesn't matter all that much which means you use to keep it (EndNote is popular, but there are many alternatives). What does matter is that you yourself create your own bibliographic record of the books, articles, and sources you encounter in your reading, and that you structure that record in your own fashion. Online search tools have made it much easier to find whatever it may be if you already know what you are looking for. But they also inundate you with useless information if you do not already know what you are looking for.

There is no better way to develop a sound grasp on the scholarly literature that you will need to master than to create your own record of the books and articles you have read, would like to read, whose titles you have noticed because they seem to be pertinent, that have been recommended to you by a friend, and so on.

- **Second, keep notes on everything you read**

Here again it doesn't matter all that much which means you use to keep notes. Different ways of keeping notes work for different people. The important thing is that you keep them. There is no more effective way to develop a firm grasp of someone else's thought than to find your own words for it and write them down. It beats underlining and xeroxing by a whole order of magnitude.

Here is what I do with books and articles of which I have my own copies: I write annotations in the margins; I write short summary statements of what I have read on the blank pages at the beginning or the end of the book; I create my own index and table of contents on the blank pages at the beginning or the end, identifying crucial pages and the reasons why they are crucial, and noting the major sections of the book. If I run out of space, I start taking notes on paper and put them in the book or keep them in a file.

With books and articles I do not own, it depends on how important they are to me. At one extreme, if I really want to master their contents, because they are crucial to my scholarly work or because they figure prominently in a course I am going to teach, I write out detailed notes, on letter size notepads or in a Word document. Notes in Word documents are easier to search, and you can quote from them without having to retype anything. But I have found that they are not nearly as firmly planted in my memory as notes I have taken in longhand. At the other extreme, if I merely want to keep a trace in my memory that I did actually read this article, or at least took a look at it, and perhaps a trace of what it was about, I may enter a sentence or two in the EndNote catalog entry I have to this article or book.

Whatever I do, I've made it a cardinal principle to distinguish clearly between three different types of notes:

1. Direct, verbatim quotations: I put these in quotation marks, and I check them for accuracy in terms of spelling and punctuation at the time that I take the note. That requires some effort, but I've found it to be a very good investment of my time. It means that, whenever I encounter quotation marks in my notes, I know I can use the enclosed text as a verbatim quotation, and I don't need to go back to the original to check my quotation for accuracy.
2. My own thoughts about what I'm reading: I enclose those in square brackets, the symbol that is commonly used in scholarly editions to distinguish editorial additions from the words of the source. That helps me to make sure that I do not inadvertently attribute something to the author of the book I'm reading that's in fact merely my own observation about what I am reading.

3. Paraphrase of the contents of what I'm reading: everything that's not included in brackets or in quotation marks. Notes that aren't included in quotation marks or in brackets are merely my attempt to paraphrase what's written there. They report the content of what I read, rather than my own thoughts about what I read. I can't use them to quote the author directly. But they remind me of the contents of what I read, and they fix what I'm reading more firmly in my memory as I'm reading it. They usually make up the bulk of whatever notes I take.

Some people love to keep notes in spiral notebooks, so they have a chronological record of their notes. I prefer to have my notes arranged systematically, in manila folders, by topic. Some people love to keep notes in Word documents, or directly in EndNote. I used to prefer longhand, but now I usually keep notes in Word documents or I buy the book, so I can write notes in the margins. Some people use index cards. I used to love index cards, but no more. And so on.

Whatever you do is fine, so long as it helps you to plant what you read in your memory. Just make sure that you do keep notes.

An example of notes taken from a primary source

What follows is an example of the most detailed kind of notes I have taken from primary sources, in this case a letter from Hermann Conring to his friend Justus Gesenius in which he writes frankly about his views on heresy.

Note the use of square brackets to separate my own comments *about* Conring's letter from paraphrases of statements *in* Conring's letter, and the use of quotation marks to identify verbatim quotations. Note also the page references. I can quote directly from these notes in anything I'd like to publish without having to consult the original. If I hadn't been publishing on Conring, I wouldn't have taken notes as detailed as this.

Hermann Conring, "De haeresi et haeticorum poenis," *Opera*, ed. Johann Wilhelm Goebel (Brunsvigae: Meyer, 1730) 6:631-3

Letter of Fer. IV. Trinitatis 1641 to Justus Gesenius, his friend.

NO ONE SO FAR HAS GOTTEN HERESY QUITE RIGHT. HE IS DISSATISFIED WITH ALL VIEWS.

p. 631: Commends Gesenius for his sacred studies. Wishes that he knew someone who had dealt properly with heresy. Complains that even Augustine, not to mention the papacy, takes it too easy on heresy. No one seems to properly recognize the difficulty of the issue: "Utinam vero possim tibi nominare saltim unum, qui locum istum de *haeresi* paulo accuratius sit persecutus! offendit hic difficultatem, et salebras ipse sanctus *Augustinus* vir oppido acutus. *Pontificii* non videntur suspendere valde iudicium: quippe qui de plano pronunciant statim haeticum, omne quod a suis sententiis dissidet. *Nostrorum* qui in hoc argumento multum laboraverit neminem novi: nec satis scio, an omnes recte ibi constant."

[So the starting point of Conring's analysis is that heresy is more difficult than people allow. Not, that it does not exist, but that it has been misrepresented by Catholics, and that no Protestant seems to have dealt with it properly.]

He does not agree completely with *Marcus Antonius* (de Dominis); Calixt seems to share de Dominis' views, though in the *De officio pii viri* he seems to agree with Cassander.

He has disagreed with both of them, but he no longer trusts the arguments he made there [if I read this correctly].

He believes that the *Remonstrants* depart far from scripture and from perpetual Christian views.

The central problem is that Protestants define heresy too narrowly, and Catholics too loosely: "Ut tamen paucas dubitationes meas, quas expediri opto, non dissimulo, *Cassandrum*, *Marcum Antonium*, et *Remonstrantes* nimis arctis finibus videri *haeresin* includere; *Pontificios* contra nimis laxis."

How could you prove (as **Cassander** maintains) that heresy is only what "diserte et formaliter" conflicts with the Apostles' creed? That's too narrow [for

Conring]. That creed was simply directed against the heresies of that time (as Erasmus maintains properly against the Parisians). Otherwise the church would not have dared to make additions later on (as it did in most councils) or to declare Pelagianism a heresy, because Pelagianism did not formally contradict the Apostles' creed. So Cassander is wrong.

The same argument applies to **Marcus Antonius**: he maintains that articles merely added to the faith are not heretical, even if they are false. Christians did not see it like that in antiquity. Moreover, if such additions are considered necessary for salvation, surely they do undermine the true faith. "Veri enim fidei articuli non definiunt tantum, quae sit fides salvifica, sed quod ista fides sola sit salutifera." To declare circumcision necessary for salvation, for example, is to declare a new gospel, and that is heresy.

Remonstrants fare no better. Their recent discovery ("recens ἔνρημα") is that only those things are necessary for salvation which are explicitly described as "το ἀναγκαῖον", and that those are the only things in regard to which you can err "lethaler." This is surely not ancient church doctrine, as is evident in that the Remonstrants refuse to condemn as heretical the Cerinthians, Ebionites etc. as the old church did. Moreover, Paul condemns with anathema every new gospel, and as far as Conring is concerned, "gospel" means the whole apostolic doctrine, not only those narrowly defined necessities: "cum tamen evangelii nomine omnia, nisi fallor, veniat Apostolica doctrina."

Pontificii arguments he won't even address, since it's perfectly well known that any particular church can err in defining the faith. So he defines the Catholic church as a particular church: "notum quippe, peculiarem aliquam ecclesiam non tantum errare posse in definiendis fidei controversiis, sed hanc etiam plurimis modis aberrasse."

CONRING'S OWN VIEW ON WHAT HERESY IS

First, he **defines heresy**: "Puto, haeresin esse omnem errorem Apostolicae doctrinae formaliter contrarium, qui pertinaciter et cum sectae ut schismatis studio defenditur." [So the key elements are: 1. formal contradiction of 2. apostolic doctrine as a whole 3. maintained pertinaciously 4. with sectarian or schismatic intent.]

Then he considers each element in the definition:

[1.] That it must include intellectual **error** is obvious.

[2.] **Apostolica doctrina** "quo distinguo ea, quae ab Apostolis sunt tradita, ab iis, quae per consequentiam longa argumentorum serie ex prioribus illis deducuntur, aut quae alias post sunt recepta." [So apostolic doctrine is limited to apostolic teaching without logical inferences or later additions; but it is not strictly limited to Scripture, clearly against the Protestant fundamentalists].

"Solis enim illis vere Apostolicis credo constare illam salutiferam Christianismi doctrinam, reliquis non item."

[3.] You can conflict with this doctrine by **consequence** or **formally**: "His autem adversari quid potest, aut per consequentiam, aut formaliter." Erring in the

former way does not change the profession of the faith itself, so long as the person who errs this way does not know he is erring this way: "Illud nihil mutat in verae fidei professione, modo is, qui ita errat, non videat sese Apostolicae doctrinae adversari." [So the implication is you can argue about inferences as much as you like without falling into heresy, so long as you are not sure if it conflicts directly with the faith.]

pp. 631-2: Thus **only formal contradiction** constitutes real conflict with Apostolic doctrine: "Tantum ergo, qui posteriori modo [formaliter] errat, is ab Apostolica doctrina divertit."

p. 632: Every other error, of whatever type, is opposed to Christianity in the former manner (by consequence): "Priori modo omnis error, qualiscunque sit, Christianismo est oppositus. Ea enim est veritatis connexio, ut quilibet error, per consequentiam veritatem omnem oppugnet. Etsi, qua sumus ingenii hebetudine, a nobis id ipsum animadverti ita haut [sic] possit."

[Thus Conring believes firmly in the **unity of truth**, the **veritatis connexio**. If something is an error of any kind, it must conflict with the truth by a chain of logical reasoning, even if we are incapable of determining the logic.]

[4.] Purely intellectual error by itself is not enough for heresy. There must be **pertinacity**, i.e., an element of **will**. "Fateor enim, non placere mihi illos, qui in haeresi solius intellectus errorem putant subesse. Neque enim peccati actualis nomen meretur, quod non est voluntarium, multo minus opus carnis est, aut aeterna damnatione dignum." If it's not voluntary, it's not a work of the flesh, much less worthy of damnation.

Heresy most certainly IS a work of the flesh and condemned to the fire of hell: "Est autem *haeresis* peccatum grave, annumeratur operibus carnis ab Apostolo, et infernali igne punietur." I'll pass over Augustine's agreement with this view.

Definition of pertinacity: "Is vero pertinaciter errorem profitetur, cum qui contra conscientiam sive rectam sive dubiam agit, tum qui errore vincibili ducitur."

[So there are two ways of pertinacious error. One is to **go against conscience**, and the other **maintain vincible error**. So Conring clearly insists on staying with your conscience, regardless of whether it's certain or not. So you cannot declare somebody heretical who is sticking to their conscience. But Conring of course believes that conscience must rule out certain beliefs.]

The clearest case of the latter is that of **sectarianism**: people who are pleased to be recognized as the heads of **sects**, above ordinary people. "Idem autem adeo quoque sibi solet placere, ut delectetur, si novae sectae caput aut magnus fautor audiat, quo supra vulgus sapere existimetur. Certe *sectae* studium, *haeresi* proprium esse vox ipsa Graeca significat."

It doesn't matter how light the error is. Sectarianism is the most important key to heresy, the desire to rend unity, especially if the issues are not so important: "Et vero nemini non liquet, vere *opus carnis* esse, sententiis levioris momenti, ecclesiae concordiam scindere."

CONRING'S OWN VIEW ON PUNISHING HERETICS IN PRINCIPLE

Conring has two good (non malos) books on punishment of heretics, one by **Claudus de Xainites**, the other by **Alphonso de Castro**. But both breath fire, sword, wheel, and cross: "uterque autem spirat flammam, gladios, rotas, cruces." I have also read what **Calvin** and **Beza** have said about this to almost the same effect. As well as the opposing views by **Castellio**, **Cornhaert**, the **Remonstrants**.

Conring believes that the proper **ecclesiastical penalty** is clearly defined in Scripture: excommunication from all Christian community, to the point of not eating together: "Mihi videtur in sacris literis aperte satis definitum, qua *poena ecclesiastica*, verus *haereticus* aliquis sit afficiendus: nempe ejiciendum illum omni Christianorum consortio, et ne quidem cum illo edendum esse."

From this it follows that true heretics must be kicked out of **civil society** as well! Clearly a Christian society can scarcely tolerate true heretics in its midst without great damage. St. John acted on that example with Cerinthus: "Hinc vero liquet, jure haereticum etiam **civili societate** esse ejiciendum. Certe enim cum quo ne edere quidem licet homini Christiano, qui consortio Christiano est indignus, quomodo ille sine magno societatis civilis dispendio in civitate Christiana toleretur? Confirmatur idem exemplo *S. Johannis*, qui cum *Cerintho* eodem noluit balneo uti."

[Conring clearly believes in the possibility of a Christian civil society! Separation of church and state does thus not for him exclude separation of Christianity from civil society.]

This means you have the right to punish heretics with **exile**. Conring has no doubt about that. He is not certain that **capital punishment** is also permissible, at least so long as there is some hope of emendation: "Num itaque *exilio* liceat in illum animadvertere, non dubito. De *capitali* supplicio dubito; quamdiu certe spes aliqua emendationis superest; desperandum autem non est tereme de quoquam."

CONRING'S RESTRICTIONS ON THESE PENALTIES IN PRACTICE: TODAY EVERY ERROR IS INVINCIBLE

But all of this applies only to true heretics who are known to be true heretics. But it is often impossible to tell whether they are committing vincible error or not: "Saepe autem potest latere, an is, qui aberrat a regula Christianae et Apostolicae doctrinae, vincibili an vero invincibili teneatur ignorantia." [Note the shift from **error** to **ignorantia**]

This is much harder today than it used to be in antiquity: "Nostra certe hac tempestate valde id est difficile judicatu: longe certe difficilium quam primae ecclesiae aetate. Tum enim sonabat adhuc in auribus ipsa discipulorum Apostolicorum vox; ea vero haereseon erat protervia, ut quam longissime abirent a catholica fide, Christianis contra prae summa pietate alinis ab omni impia novitate."

Today it is different: "Nunc in illo ecclesiae senio, et opinionum multitudine, quid Apostolicum, quid vere καθολικόν sit, invenire quantumvis allabores,

perquam laboriosum. Igitur vix etiam est, ut nulla in parte a veritate Apostolicae doctrinae aberres. In ea autem ambiguitate etiam errores omnes, in quibusdam prope sunt invincibiles."

Thus most Christians nowadays may be in error, but not therefore in heresy, because their error is today invincible. Invincible error deserves forgiveness: "Equidem haud dubito plerosque Christianos variis erroribus teneri, haeresi tamen infectos non dixerim. Constat vero, errorem invincibilem, veniam, si non plene, saltem aliquatenus, mereri."

Moreover, it is above our ability to judge whether someone is caught in vincible or invincible error. Thus we ought to leave the judgment to God: "Est vero prope supra captum humani iudicii, exacte judicare, vincibili quis an invincibili errore teneatur. Forte itaque in re dubia consultum fuerit, solius Dei iudicio illos omnes committere."

"Recta ratio" teaches the same conclusion, as does "tantum non perspicue" the Apostle, when he forbids "*servum alienum judicare: Domino enim illum stare, Domino cadere.*" This is how **Salvianus** dealt with Arians: he considered them to be heretics without their own knowledge.

St. Paul proves by his own example that heretics are not immediately to be excommunicated by the way he deals with the **Galatians**.

WHAT IS NONETHELESS POSSIBLE

Conring has no doubt that **Christians can be compelled to listen to proper doctrine**: "De eo non dubito, etiam invitum posse jure poenis cogi ad auscultandam meliorem doctrinam et institutionem."

The great conclusion: It is not in our power to err or not to err. But it is in our power to try not to err. Hence we can lawfully be compelled to **honesty and piety insofar as these depend upon our will**: "In qualibet enim civili societate licet magistratui, cives etiam refractarios ad honestatem et pietatem vel invitos cogere, quatenus honestas, et pietas a voluntate humana dependet; jam ut errare et non errare non sit in potestate nostra, operam tamen dare aut non dare ne erremus, nostri arbitrii est."

Augustine was of the opposed point of view, but he was forced to change his mind by the Donatists: "Scio *S. Augustinum* contra sensisse, et ab omni coercitione fuisse alienum: Scio vero eundem et mutasse opinionem, cum videret optimum fructum coercitionis in longo illo et refractario *Donatistarum* schismate."

CONCLUSION: STILL UNCERTAIN

Conring concludes by pointing out that he would like to learn more. He is not satisfied with his own argumentation. "Ego vero volebam significare tantum, neque alios neque me mihi in hoc argumento satisfacere, adeoque cupere me etiam atque etiam abs te erudiri."

He concludes with expressions of confidence in Gesenius and hope for enlightenment from him.

pp. 632-3: He is not happy about being stuck in Brunswick, whence he is writing. He especially regrets not having any books around. But he's being kept busy by sick people, who are asking his help. He can't think about the state

without contemplating emigration. He's kept here so far by his love of scholastic life.

"Ego interim haereo hic animo invitissimo: neque exitum funesti [632/633] hujus negotii, neque spem perfectionis videns. Id maxime cruciat, quod ab omnibus libris absim: etsi otiari me non sinant multi aegroti, qui auxilium meum indies implorant. De republica cogitare pene taedet. Certe nunquam id ago, quin simul de aliis laribus parandis cogitem: quas tamen cogitationes hactenus excutere me jubet scholasticae vitae amor. Deus misereatur nostri!"

[No one can therefore really be considered a true heretic unless they go against conscience or are openly sectarian. That leaves only violation of conscience or disturbance of public peace as effective criteria of heresy.]

An example of notes taken from a secondary source

What follows is an example of the most detailed kind of notes I have taken from the secondary literature, in this case on an excellent article by Inge Mager on Hermann Conring writings on theology, which spared me a great deal of reading in other sources.

Note the use of square brackets to separate my own comments *about* Mager's article from paraphrases of statements *in* Mager's article, and the use of quotation marks to identify verbatim quotations. Note also the detailed page references. I can quote directly from these notes in anything I'd like to publish without having to consult the original. If I hadn't been publishing on Conring, I wouldn't have taken notes as detailed as this.

Inge Mager, "Hermann Conring als theologischer Schriftsteller - insbesondere in seinem Verhältnis zu Georg Calixt," in: Michael Stolleis, ed. *Hermann Conring (1606-1681): Beiträge zu Leben und Werk* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983) 55-84

[This essay is chock full of excellent empirical information, but it is weakened by a confessionally grounded perspective that prevents the author from grasping the systematic coherence of Conring's thought, its principled nature, and the passion with which Conring defended it throughout his life -- except, out of respect for his teachers, against Calixtus. The reason why he doesn't argue with Calixtus is scarcely uncertainty or doubt or relativism; it's respect. He doesn't want to show up the old man.]

55: More than a quarter of Conring's library consisted of "theologica".

56: "Conring war kein Theologe und wollte auch keiner sein. Gibt man diesen Anspruch auf, kann man seinem beachtlichen theologischen Werk besser gerecht werden."
[Nice lapidary judgment.]

In Leiden remonstrants and counter-remonstrants were fighting about the relationship between political power and religion, and about predestination.

He must have learned his theology in Leiden. But he did dedicate his *De origine formarum* to his "teachers" Hornejus and Calixt: that's a bit strange.

56-9: DE ORIGINE FORMARUM

56-7: In the dedication he praises them for having led him to the holy sources of philosophy:

56 n. 10: "Vestra enim cura ad sacros Philosophiae fontes adductus sum; ex illis quicquid hactenus hausi, scaturit. Docuistis me veritatem seriis argumentis ponderare, non vanis titulis ... Quare pervetera sunt quae trado, licet prima fronte videra [sic] nova possint." Quoted from *Opera* 6:348.

[That's the foundation for Conring: sacred foundation of truth behind the appearances. It always remained like that. From the start, he had a clear sense of this distinction between surface and reality, in theology as well as elsewhere.]

57: Form und Materie, Akt und Potenz: creation transforms potentiality into actuality by giving form to matter. Matter is not nothing, nor is it real being.

n. 11: "materia autem per solam mutationem investigari potest."

57-8: [Mager believes that there is a basic difference between Conring and Calixt noticeable here: Conring emphasizes changeability of matter, Calixt emphasizes the dependence of form on matter and matter as continuity rather than changeability. I doubt this analysis.]

[In order to disentangle the philosophical foundations here, and especially the differences between Calixt and Conring that Mager claims to see, you have to know about the debate about *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta* -- Calixt in n. 14 is clearly speaking about that difference when he opposes *nature* to *absolutam Dei* [sc. *potentiam*].]

Conring had doubts about the immortality of the soul. [I think it's crucial here to stress that he had doubts about the knowability of immortality. That's a different thing. He distinguished immortality of the soul from our understanding of it.]

58-9: He seems to have liked Barlaeus' views more than Calixt's. [It's not so easy to distinguish these. Mager takes Conring's letter to Barlaeus at face value as "leidenschaftlich" -- that's very doubtful. Nothing is certain for Conring in these matters, and Mager can't make it so.]

59- 62: CONRING, NEUHAUS, AND CALIXT IN THE DE ORIGINE

61: In the preface to the *De Origine* Conring commits himself to Vincent of Lerin's principle of tradition on which Calixt relied in 1629 for his union theology: the oldest tradition is the closest to the truth. Later documents have no historical value. Cf. Vincent, *Commonit.* I, 2 (PL 60:640).

Gryphiander blamed Conring for plagiarizing Calixt in 1647: it was all copied! Conring wanted Calixt to set the record straight (as did Gryphiander), but Calixt said nothing; very disappointing for Conring.

62-67: CONRING'S OVERALL POSITION ON THEOLOGY

62: Conring wasn't a theologian, only someone who know theology very well and had mostly "kirchenpolitische Interessen." Other than dealing with theological questions in notes and letters, he wrote only occasional and polemical pieces from which it is impossible to derive a "Gesamtposition." Mostly he focused on the writings of his opponents. So he didn't have to develop his own system.

"Im Grunde ist es nur ein Thema, dem Conring sich in barocker Unerschöpflichkeit immer wieder zuwandte: das römische Papsttum. Dogmatische Abhandlungen schrieb er nicht ... " and even his *Pietas* came only ten years after Calixt's death.

[That's true, and on top of that the *Pietas* **wasn't** a piece of dogmatic theology. He studiously stayed away from theology. But even so Mager misses a point: Conring's refusal to engage in theological debate makes it impossible to find a systematic theology in his writings, but that refusal is ITSELF systematic. The system is not a theological one. It turns on the distinction between civil affairs and

theological matters. Theology is the problem, not the solution. To add to theological debate would merely make matters worse.

So there is a "Gesamtposition" on theology, and even if it is not itself theological in nature, it is most definitely **about** theology. And on the basis of **that** position he argues vehemently against all theologians who disagree with it, above all the papacy.]

The Inaugural Lecture

63: Calixt and Hornejus were upset with Conring's approach to the difference between revelation and reason in his inaugural lecture, not to mention his remarks about faith, praxis pietatis, and immortality in the Old Testament. We can't reconstruct it exactly because the documents burned in WW II. [StA Hannover P 18 b.]

[So the inaugural lecture shows that for Conring the dichotomy between faith and reason is crucial right from the start. Clearly he went further than Calixt in separating faith from theology, and in moving theology towards pure reason, or rather developing a much sharper distinction between rational and theological matters. He may not even have shared Calixt's view of theology as rational.]

63-4: The rift left permanent scars on their relationship. It's telling that Conring never turned to Calixt for theological advice, but only to Gesenius, Henichius, and Titius [but we don't have the correspondence with Calixt!].

64: "Theologie war für Conring wie für viele seiner Zeitgenossen noch eine totale Kategorie." [That's precisely what I doubt.]

64 n. 45: Conring an Boineburg 29.xii.1656 (Comm. Epist. 202): "Ut abstineam operam ab omni sacro argumento eamque solis Politicis impendam, quod suades, utinam liceat! Nec vero me latet, si consilio tuo obsequar, posse me in multorum amicitia vivere, qui sacris illis disputationibus offenduntur; nec adeo sum imprudens, ut sciens volensque gratis mihi ipsi damnum creem, nec ex illa opera est vel nomen exspectum vel lucrum, cum utrumque aliunde longe mihi rectius queat parari ... At vero, O optime, conscius mihi sum quid a Deo sim nactus prae multis quidque vicissim in officio meo sit quamve poenam merar, si illi desum."

[That's a great quote about Conring's understanding of his responsibility, what Mager calls a "fast charismatisch zu nennendes Verantwortungsgefühl." But it is NOT evidence that theology is a **total category** for Conring.]

64 n. 46: [A great declaration of Conring's faith an Baluzius] in a letter to Baluze of 24.viii.1671 in *Syntagma dua* (Helmstedt 1694) 33: "Enimvero sancte tibi testor me sacrae doctrinae operam plurimam impendisse nulla lucri, nulla honorum expectatione, sed tranquillandae duntaxat tot inter religiosa nostri temporis dissidia conscientiae et aeternae salutis causa, omnique partium seposito studio id unice sectatum esse **quod ubique, quod semper quod ab omnibus creditum est ex Vincentii etiam vestri sententia ...**"

[So here we get Vincent's definition of the faith as normative for Conring. What a lovely illustration of what I have called the naturalization of religion.

Conring clearly is convinced that his distinction of politics from the confessional disputes **is** the true faith.]

64: [Mager defends Conring on the grounds that he was "selfless". She thinks he ought not to be blamed for avoiding direct theological debate. That was a consequence of the conflict with Calixt and of his own uncertainty about theology, she thinks. She's misconstruing him there. Of course he should not be blamed. He should be praised. He was completely clear about what he did not know, and also that what he did not know could not be made the foundation of politics. This was not "konfessionelle Unentschiedenheit." This was a matter of principle.]

64 n. 49: E. Wolf's judgment (4th ed. p. 224): "Trotz seiner theologischen Studien muss sein evangelisches Glaubensleben im Vergleich mit den grossen Rechtsdenkern der eigentlichen Reformationszeit als dünn und abgeblasst bezeichnet werden ... Was ihn zum Arminianismus hinzog, war die hier zu findenden verstandesmäßige Kühle, die Ausschaltung verwegener Dogmen und die mehr ethisch-philosophische Auffassung des Christentums."

[Mager wants to defend Conring against this charge on the basis of his well-meant intentions, but that's the wrong way to go about it. It's not true, as she believes, that he basically just wanted to get along with people who thought differently. p. 64 she says: "Es ging ihm weniger um dogmatische Richtigkeiten als vielmehr darum, mit einem Andersdenkenden friedlich auszukommen." If that were all, why such hostility to the Catholics? The point is that he was indeed **passionate**, but that his passion was about a distinction between faith and reason, church and state that was not shared by other confessional thinkers. He served this distinction throughout his life.]

64-5: Mager maintains that he had no "Gespür" for the "subtilen dogmatischen Unterschiede zwischen den Erben Luthers und Calvins" and that he "den Grund für die Notwendigkeit etwa des Kasseler Religionsgespräches gar nicht einsehen konnte" [Of course not. He most certainly did understand the subtle theological differences: he thought they were a huge problem.]

65 n. 50: Conring writes to Duke August in 1661 on the Kasseler Religionsgespräch: "Suasi tantum agerent de Controversiarum pondere et necessitate, utrum scilicet illae eius sunt momenti, ut iustam causam Schismatis inter Protestantas queant dare. Ego idipsum negavi." Again, he writes in his *Discursus ad Lampadium (Opera 2:380)*: "Lutherani enim reformatos voluere exclusos ab omni pace publica religiosa, et incredibile, quantum illud dissidium enervavit vires evangelicorum."

[**religious diversity**: Conring denies the justifiability of schism between Calvinists and Lutherans.]

65: Conring, according to Mager, does not believe that the Bible is clear about predestination and does not seem to share the strict view of predestination. But he doesn't think it's so important. What's important is how people act - and the fact of the matter is, Calvinists are not libertines at all, but

- especially disciplined. If God did not clarify the issue in the Bible, he certainly did not want Christians to fight with each other over the matter.
- 65 n. 53: On predestination see Conring's preface to Heinichen's *De gratia et praedestinatione dissertatio* (Rinteln, 1663).
- 66: "Natürlich fehlen bei Conring auch die für uns heute zentralen Aussagen über Glaube, Gnade und Rechtfertigung." Therefore Mager shows herself surprised that Conring is able, on occasion, to demonstrate how well he had understood Paul's "stultitia Evangelii" (with reference in nr. 57 to *Opera* 5:739), or that he was perfectly capable of following Luther's criticism of catholic works righteousness and saint worship (with reference to *Opera* 5:32 n. b).
- [She is surprised only because she hasn't understood that Conring DID know these matters, but VALUED them differently.]
- Mager finds it amazing that in his Festvortrag on Michaelis 1645 he insists "in nicht zu überbietender Eindringlichkeit" that "Gott nur in Jesus Christus verehrt werden wolle und der Sinn eines Heiligenfestes allein darin bestehen könne, Gott für die 'custodia angelorum' zu danken." (with reference to *De Purgatorio* p. 144).
- 66-7: Conring publicly opposed the orders of Duke Johann Friedrich of Hannover (who had converted to catholicism) about the veneration of St. Anthony of Padua in his *Animadversio* of 1675.
- [So Conring was publicly opposed to saints' worship.]

67-70: WIE DACHTE CONRING ÜBER DIE REFORMATION?

- 67-8: he thought about it as a "mutatio religionis" by which ecclesiastical power went to the territorial princes; mostly interested in it as a political reorganization of religion. He rejected the Catholic charge that Luther and Calvin thought of themselves as called directly by God: they were theologians, that's all.
- 67-8 n. 67: "Omne autem illud ius Episcoporum sublatum est e medio per istam religionis mutationem." (From *Discursus ad Lampadium*, *Opera* 2:378). "Mutationem illam religionis, quae avorum patrumque memoria in Europa facta est, non sine divino numine contigisse ... Ex solo divino verbo religionis cujuscunque veritatem discere est." (From a letter to Titius of 5.ii.1660, *Opera* 6:383).
- 68-9: paid special attention to Luther's Bible translation because of Duke August's attempt at a new translation that he asked Conring's son-in-law Johann Saubert (1638-1688; Orientalist in Helmstedt) to prepare in 1664 and that began to appear in 1666.
- 69: Conring defended Duke August against the charges of Calov etc. in the *Epistola Gratulatoria* of 1666. He praised Luther's accomplishment, but denied it to be authentic or impossible to improve. He maintained (on the basis of the distinction between faith and theology) that a so-so translation was just fine for ordinary folk, but that theologians needed a precise text. The result was a long controversy with the Kiel Orientalist Wasmuth (1625-1688) that led to a suit by Conring in the Oberhofgericht in Gottorf.

70-3: WIE STAND CONRING ZUR KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHE?

70: the basic point is always the same: neither the spiritual nor the political claims to rule by the papacy can be derived from Scripture or tradition. He considers this to be a **superstition** and can't understand why Boineburg would go for it. He insists it is counter to **reason**.

70 n.82: He writes to Boineburg 24.i.1652 (Comm. Epist. 36): "Juro tibi, mi Amice, nihil videri a recta ratione alienius quam credere vel Romanum Papam solum vel illum cum suo Episcoporum consortio esse infallibilem, nec salvari quem posse, nisi alterutrum qui crediderit."

70: to insist on papal and conciliar infallibility may be **blasphemy**, and in any case good Christians must certainly keep their distance from such folk.

70 n. 83: "Nec Papam nec Romanae Ecclesiae Episcopos, qui in Conciliis congregantur, quae oecumenica illi vocant, divinis indubitatae fidei tabellis posse ostendere se eos esse, quos volunt se credi et quales a vulgo misere decepto creduntur, sanctissimi numinis in hisce terris circa fidem et mores infallibiles vicarios, adeoque forte committere eos gravissimum laesae divinae maiestatis crimen, certe omnibus Christo fidelibus non minus ab iis quam a Pseudoprophetis sibi cavendum esse." From *Fundamentorum ... Concussio*, Vorrede, p. 6.

70: Mt. 16:18 refers not only to Peter; Eph. 2:20 shows the foundation of the church are all apostles and prophets; the rock on which the church rests is Christ himself; and the church is the community of all the faithful, who believe with Vincent of Lerins what's always been believed everywhere.

70 n. 85: He quotes Vincent in his letter to Boineburg of 12.v.1652 (*Opera*, 6:497).

71: He likes Hilary of Poitiers (like Calixt) on the simplicity of real faith. The ancient church was aristocratic, not monarchical, till Gregory the Great. Boniface is to blame for papal rule over Germany. German bishops were originally chosen by German people and confirmed by the Emperor. The Emperor has the right to convoke councils (this from his dissertations on bishops and councils).

His political attack is forthright. But he barely addresses any theological differences with Catholics. Even in his dispute with the Jesuit Mulmann (who reacted against Justus Gesenius' 1643 Helmstedt *Dissertatio Theol. de igne purgatorio*, 2nd ed. 1650, by publishing his own *Assertiones de purgatorio* Münster, 1647, also in Conring's *De purgatoria* 166-211), he did not enter deeply into the theology.

71-2: Gesenius rejected the idea of penalties to be suffered after death; Conring limits himself to absence of scriptural foundations, doesn't really engage.

72: Calixt identified the Pope with Antichrist (see his *Orationes duae de Antichristo Pontifice Romano*, Helmstedt 1658). Conring identified him with the whore Babylon.

The main impulse for Conring's religious polemics came from counter-reformatory attacks in the 1650s. He published five pieces in 1654, but then withdrew on the grounds that it doesn't always help to say too much.

[**Note this:**] 72 n. 99: letter to Titius of 5.ii.1660 (*Opera* 6:381) **on keeping silent**: "Nec vero opus est litigare amplius ... imo interest veritatis non respondere voculis, cum illa nimium altercando soleat saepenumero vim suam auctoritatemque perdere. Non sane respondit etiam in iudicio ad calumnias omnes Salvator noster. Idem jam ante Socrates fecerat."

73: Conring wanted to remove confessional hatred by denying the truth to the opposition. But it seems that like Calixt he failed: "Es bleibt wie bei Calixt eine tiefe Unausgeglichenheit zwischen Polemik und Irenik bei ihm bestehen." [That's true, but not for the reasons Mager offers. **She does not give him sufficient credit for the clarity and foundational importance of his distinction between theological opinion and political unity.**]

73-7: WELCHE MÖGLICHKEITEN SAH CONRING FÜR RELIGIÖSE TOLERANZ?

73: Conring had to think about toleration since his youth in Friesland and especially since Leiden. His basic principle is a clear distinction: "Conring ist von der grundsätzlichen Eigenständigkeit des Weltlichen gegenüber dem Geistlichen überzeugt und lehnt es deshalb ab, Andersdenkenden mit Gewalt oder Strafe zu begegnen, wenn diese die Grundnormen der natürlichen Religion anerkennen, ihre Bürgerpflichten erfüllen, keine Unruhe stiften und ihre Überzeugungen nicht hartnäckig verteidigen." [OK, except that she does not recognize the architectonic significance of this distinction].

73 n. 101: Letter to Gesenius of 18.vii. 1641 *Opera* 6:631, the **definition of heresy**: "Haeresin esse omnem errorem Apostolicae doctrinae formaliter contrarium, qui pertinaciter et cum sectae aut schismatis studio defenditur." And on the **obligation of the state** in *Discursus ad Lampadium*, *Opera* 2:374: "Summa Majestas tenetur omnem aberrantem in fide tueri ab injuria, debet enim tueri omnem bonum civem, ut tranquille vivat in republica, jam vero, licet quis erret in fide, tamen potest esse bonus civis, et sic defendi debet ab injuria." [**A neat Aristotelian distinction between the good citizen and the true believer.**]

73: Conring demands **libertas dissentendi** (in the dissertation *De Majestatis ... officio circa sacra* (*Opera* 6:641), because its denial disturbs the peace. Like Thomas More, he maintained that "Staatsbürgerschaft und Kirchenmitgliedschaft sind grundsätzlich zu trennen." He could well imagine a state in which different confessions, even different religions coexisted.

73-4: But of course this required toleration as Conring found it in Holland, Poland, and Brandenburg.

74: That's why he approved the Great Electors prohibition of polemics between Lutherans and Calvinists in Brandenburg in 1664. In this sense Conring was unusual in Germany.

74 n. 105: quoting an unpublished and undated letter to Duke August (StA Wolfenbüttel: 1 Alt 22, Nr. 238 Bl. 1 r): "Das Churfürstliche Edict habe Ich bereits vorher gelesen, Und befinde darinnen nichts, so zu tadeln. Besondern erachte es höchstnützlich und Christlich ... So viel die concordiam et pacem Ecclesiasticam inter Augustanae Confessioni

addictos nos et Reformatos belanget, habe ich von vielen Jahren hero fleissich denselben nachgesonnen und Ehrn D. Calixt moderation allemahl beygepflichtet ..."

His *Irenaeus Eubulus* of 1648: toleration of heresy is better than war. Calls on princes to protect true believers and heretics equally, and to leave the question of heresy to theologians.

74 n. 107: Conring's conclusion, quoted from *Opera*, 2:481: "Pacem perpetuam Protestantibus dare oportet. Postulat hoc extrema miseria miserorum catholicorum, postulat salus ecclesiae et reipublicae, quarum utraque tractu belli longiore magis magisque in discrimen conjicitur, postulate denique id innocens sanguis, qui durante bello funditur, et animarum aeterna beatitudo, quae itidem in discrimen conjicitur, quia impietas una cum bello vires accipit." And again 2:483: "At vero in quantum vel haeresis vel fides catholica debeat ab injuria temporali defendi, cum sit temporalis cura et unice faciat ad civilem vitam ejusque felicitatem, non potest quoque non unice convenire civili Principi. Ast intra hosce limites manet caesarea Majestas, manent Principes catholici pacem civilem haereticis concedentes."

74: n. 108: *Opera* 2:487: It can't be the function of religion to coerce religion: "Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debet, non vi."

75: This sounds like modern freedom of conscience. But Conring considered the "libertas religionis" as a positive right (positives Recht) granted first to Princes between two confessions, and between three since Westphalia.

"Conring scheint hier weniger vom einzelnen und seinen Persönlichkeitsrechten auszugehen als von der Notwendigkeit des Staates, der das Recht der freien Religionswahl auch wieder revozieren kann, wenn es dem Wohl des Volkes dient. Insofern bleibt er in der politischen Praxis hinter seiner eigenen Theorie zurück." [Hardly.]

"Der bürgerliche Friede ist ihm das Hauptziel [granted], ist dieser gefährdet, kann die Gewissensfreiheit zum 'beneficium emigrationis' zusammenschrumpfen." [Seen too narrowly].

Conring believed that private interests could be overcome by public interests [too simple]. See for example his remarkable interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. He does not consider this as an attack on Mosaic Law, but only on phariseism (see his annotations on Grotius, *Opera* 5:52ff.). And he believes that individuals may not use the *ius talionis*, but the state should certainly use it.

"Conrings Irenik ist politisch verankert, hier fehlt fast jede theologische Argumentation." [Of course, unless you recognize that the distinction he draws IS theologically grounded -- but on a different understanding of theology. **Mager presupposes the distinction between theology and politics that Conring helped to bring about. That's her main weakness.**]

76: Calixt hoped for confessional reconciliation. "Conring dagegen, der schon so etwas wie religiösen Pluralismus vorausahnte, betrachtete Toleranz durchaus als eine Dauerlösung."

"Conring war im Unterschied zu Calixt kein Unionsmann, ihm ging es allein um pax und tolerantia."

77: "Salus Germaniae unice collocata est in mutua partium tolerantia et stricta pactorum publicorum observatione." Conring to Boineburg, 5.i.1656 (Comm. Epist., 146).

77-84: WELCHE VORSTELLUNGEN HATTE CONRING VOM KIRCHENREGIMENT?

77: Conring considers the church a "collegium" within the state.

77 n. 121: "Ecclesia in hisce terris non est vere respublica, sed naturam potius habet collegii." Quoted from *De constit. Episcop.* coroll. III.

77: Lang, p. 221, considers Conring a representative of "naturrechtlich-territorialistischer kirchnrechtlicher Theorien".

77 n. 123: Conring is certain that no state can exist without religion: "Absque ejusmodi cultu societatem humanam nullam posse subsistere." *De Majestat. aut.*, th. xi (*Opera*, 4:617). Again: "impossibile est, ut resp. aliqua salva esse possit absque cultu divino et religione, impossibile enim est, ut homines, qui Numen non agnoscunt, possint recte se gerere in civili societate ... Nullum itaque majus vinculum est, quo homines in officio contineri possint, quam religio. Nulla enim civitas potest consistere absque studio virtutis ..., at vero nemo virtuosus est, nisi credat providentiam Dei. Religio ergo est necessaria ad remp. ejusque salutem." *Discursus ad Lamp.*, *Opera*, 2:371.

77-8, n. 126: The state has the right to use force in the area of natural religion: "Scilicet vis ἀρχιτεκτονική sacri cultus consistit partim in potestate ferendarum legum positivarum, quibus astringantur cives, ut, nisi pareant, cogi possint, partim in potestate cogendi cives ..." *De Majestat. aut.* th. 35, *Opera* 4:621. Again: "Religio enim naturaliter nota ita necessaria est reipublicae ... Hinc enim potest imperari, et qui refragatur puniri debet, qui igitur negant providentiam divinam non sunt tolerandi, subruunt enim civilem societatem ... Quaecunque sunt merae revelationes neque possunt neque debent imperari, quoniam proprie non pertinent ad salutem reip. civilem ..." *Discursus ad Lamp.*, *Opera*, 2:372).

78 n. 127: Conring did insist that revealed religion was crucial for salvation. He just did not believe it was the state's right to enforce it. "Apparet jam quam impie fallantur qui non dubitant profiteri religionem natura notam sufficere hominibus ad salutem, quae sententia funditus tollit omnem revelatam christianam religionem ... Sine Evangelio enim nemo salvari potest." *Discursus ad Lamp* (*Opera*, 2:372). [Mager comments:] "Aus dem allen geht auch klar hervor, dass Conring kein Vertreter einer allgemeinen Vernunftreligion war, wie E. Wolf ihn sieht (a.a.O. S.243)."

78: "Der Glaube an Gott, den Weltenlenker, kann befohlen werden, der Glaube an den Erlöser Jesus Christus ist nur durch den hl. Geist möglich und kann höchstens empfohlen werden."

- The state can only take care of external ecclesiastical functions: "... alles was durch positive Gesetze geregelt werden kann: Ordnungsgemässe Wortverkündigung, Erziehungswesen, Organisation und wirtschaftliche Ausstattung der Kirche, kultische und disziplinäre Gesetzgebung, Einberufung von Synoden, Bestrafung von hartnäckigen Häretikern."
- For God did not command any particular ecclesiastical organization but left that up to human freedom and insight.
- 78 n. 130: "Nec Deus de Ecclesiastico regimine quidquam mandavit multo minus unum universae Ecclesiae regem dedit, sed ejusmodi omnia hominum prudentiae atque arbitrio permisit prout expedire visum fuerit constituere." *Cassandri et Wicelii ...*, p. 35. Similarly in letter to Titius of 5.ii.1660 (*Opera* 6:387): "Nego duntaxat a Deo aut Apostolis regimen ecclesiae unicum aliquod esse ita constitutum, ut, si οἰκοδομή aliud postulet, non etiam mutare liceat ... Ego sane ex politica Philosophia dudum novi varias esse etiam bonas reipublicae formas et pro ingenio et rebus populi aliam atque aliam civitatibus convenire nec nisi admodum raro plenam μοναρχίαν esse utilem."
- 79: He does believe that the prince has a special responsibility for the church.
- 79 n. 133: *Discurs. ad Lamp.* (*Opera* 2:398): "Certum autem est, quod toti ecclesiae sive omnibus ejus membris incumbat id officii, ut servent salutem publicam ecclesiae. Quemadmodum autem non tantum clerici, sed et laici sunt membra hujus corporis, ita et his competit haec cura ... Quandquidem autem inter laicos praecipuo loco sunt Principes, ideo illis quam maxime incumbit cura conservandi ecclesiam."
- 79: The syncretist battles seem to have strengthened Conring's conviction that theological polemics had to be, not settled, but kept within limits by means of princely authority.

79-83: CONRING AND CALIXT

- 79-80: Chancellor Schwartzkopff (Calixt's brother in law) produced a consilium for the duke, probably in 1649, in which he dealt with princely authority in theological matters.
- 80: Schwartzkopff and Gesenius (in Hannover) seem to be closer to Conring than to Calixt in their willingness to allow princely authority to proceed against heretics. But "Hier ist in der Forschung noch einiges offen."
- 80-81: Factors promoting princely authority in theological matters were: the tendency of the theologians to constant polemics, the terrible condition of the church after the war, the catholic charges of protestant anarchy, and not least the execution of Charles I and Cromwell's lordship.
- 81: Calixt thought that in principle the church should be ruled by bishops. But we have no writings from Calixt on this matter after 1649 (when syncretist battles and Charles I's execution may have reduced the freedom Calixt wanted to leave to the theologians.)
- 81-2: It would be useful to detail the differences on this score between Calixt on the one hand, and Schwartzkopff, Gesenius, Schrader, and Conring on the other.

82: Conring surely learned a lot from Calixt, but it seems telling that we have no clear expression of Calixt's views on what was surely his most famous student: he seems to have had reservations [surely, at least since the inaugural of 1632].

For Conring's views of Calixt, see his *Programma* on Calixt's funeral of 1656.

83-4: CONRING'S USE OF MEDICINE IN THEOLOGY

83: A footnote on Conring's use of blood circulation in speaking about Christ's passion: a scientific explanation of the flowing of blood and water from Christ's wound. No miracles, please. On top, he wants to show Christ had no human fear or weakness. This was preserved only because a Hildesheim Pastor published them in 1674 in ...

84: his *Passionsandachten*. Conring wasn't happy (see *Passionsandachten*, pp. 268-78), but let it happen.